Reynolds faced a privilege of proof. However, there are other circumstances in which pleadings must be dismissed without ever addressing the issue of evidence.12FootnoteReynolds, 345 U.S. to 11, n.26. Noting that federal courts should refuse to bring an infringement action to enforce an agreement to compensate a person who provided espionage services during the Civil War, the court said in Totten v. United States that public order prohibits the maintenance of any action before a court, the hearing of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of cases, which the law itself considers confidential.13Footnote92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876). See also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (repetition and application of Totten`s broader assertion that prosecutions based on alleged espionage treaties are totally prohibited). In Tenet, the Court distinguished Webster v. Doe based on an obvious difference.

between a lawsuit filed by a recognized (though secret) CIA employee and a lawsuit filed by an alleged former spy. Id. at p. 10. An executive agreement[1] is an agreement between the heads of government of two or more countries that has not been ratified by the legislature when treaties are ratified. Executive agreements are considered politically binding to distinguish them from legally binding contracts. Presidents have had more than one opportunity to be in a protective relationship with their subordinates, provided that their defense in a lawsuit brought against themFootnoteE.g., 6 Ops. Genesis 220 (1853); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). or take legal action on their behalf,2FootnoteUnited States v.

Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Rejection of a congressional request for documents that could be used to their detriment by the seat of government in their absence,3 footnote Z.B. 2 J. Richardson, above, at 847. Challenging the constitutional validity of a law that is considered prejudicial to their interests.4Footnote United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946). Throughout our history, presidents have sought to extend their own official immunity to their subordinates by opposing actions by courts or congressional committees to require subordinates to disclose communications from the president or president that presidents consider confidential. It is only recently, however, that the focus of the controversy has shifted from protecting the interests of the president or executive to protecting the president himself, and the location of the dispute has been moved to the courts. The doctrine of executive privilege defines the power of the president to withhold documents or information in his possession or in the possession of the executive from the mandatory procedure of the legislative or judicial process of government. The Constitution does not explicitly confer such a privilege on the executive, but it has been asserted that this privilege derives from the constitutional provision of the separation of powers and from a necessary and appropriate concept that respects the fulfillment of the duties of the Presidency imposed by the Constitution.

Historically, the affirmation of doctrine has largely been limited to the areas of external relations, military affairs, ongoing investigations, and intergovernmental discussions.5NoteFor a good statement on the basis of doctrine, the areas in which it is claimed, and historical examples, see Executive Privilege: Executive Withholding: Hearings before the Senate Judicial Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers, 92nd Congress, 1st Sess. (1971), pp. 420-43 (then Deputy Attorney General Rehnquist). Former Attorney General Rogers identified five categories of executive privileges in describing the Eisenhower administration`s position: (1) military and diplomatic secrets and foreign affairs, (2) information made confidential by law, (3) information about ongoing litigation, as well as investigation files and reports, (4) information about internal government affairs required by disclosure in the public interest. are excluded, and (5) documents related to policy development, including interdepartmental memoranda, opinions, subordinate recommendations and informal discussion papers. The President`s Power to Withhold Information from Congress, Attorney General`s Memorandum, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 85th Congress, 2d Sess. (Comm. Print) (1958), reprinted as Rogers, Constitutional Law: The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941 (1958).

In the most complete version of the doctrine, Attorney General Kleindienst argued that the president could claim the privilege of any federal government employee to keep the information secret. Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information: Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Operations on Intergovernmental Relations, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. (1973), I:18 passim. For a strong argument that the doctrine has no constitutional or other legal basis, see R. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974). However, the book precedes the court`s decision in the Nixon case. Under the Nixon administration, of course, the legal dispute was over the need to demand the confidentiality of conversations between the president and his advisers. The President of the United States is elected by voters in all states and the District of Columbia for a four-year term. Voters make up the Electoral College, which consists of 538 voters, the number of deputies and senators that currently make up Congress.

The citizens of each state vote for a list of voters, who then vote on the day prescribed for the president chosen by Congress. Congress has the power to declare war. As a result, the president cannot declare war without their consent. However, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, presidents sent troops into combat without an official declaration of war (which happened in Vietnam and Korea). The War Powers Act of 1973 sought to define when and how the president could send troops into combat by adding, among other measures, strict deadlines for reporting to Congress after sending troops to war, but this did not have much effect (see the “Resolution of War Powers” section in the article Commander in Chief Powers). If the president is subject to criminal prosecution, the question remains as to the limits of this process. The court recognized several limitations on a prosecutor`s ability to obtain evidence from the president through the use of a criminal subpoena.21FootnoteSee id. First, the Chair, like any citizen, may challenge a particular subpoena on the basis that it was issued in bad faith or was excessively broad.22FootnoteId. Second, the timing and scope of criminal investigations must be influenced by the nature of the President`s office, para. B example by granting respect in the planning of procedures to avoid significant interference in the official responsibilities of the President.23FootnoteId. Third, the President may file constitutional challenges specific to a subpoena, arguing that complying with a particular subpoena would significantly affect his efforts to fulfill an official duty.24FootnoteId. at 2431–32.

Like the Court in United States v. Nixon, a particularly notable constitutional challenge that a president can bring against a criminal subpoena is a claim of executive privilege in certain presidential communications.25Footnote418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). In Trump v. Mazars, the court, recognized several power-sharing restrictions on Congress` ability to access presidential records.36FootnoteSee 140 pp. Ct. 2019, 2036 (2020). On behalf of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts first drafted three central boundaries for all congressional investigations, regardless of the purpose of the investigation: (1) There must be a valid legislative objective with respect to an element of the law; 2. The purpose of the investigation shall not be to pursue or detect on behalf of the exhibition; and (3) certain constitutional and customary privileges may restrict the disclosure of information.37FootnoteId. 2031/32. However, the tribunal found these restrictions only to be insufficient restrictions on congressional powers in a dispute with the executive branch.38FootnoteId.

in 2033. After all, according to Mazars, any document a president possesses could relate to a conceivable legislative issue, potentially giving Congress significant power to interfere with executive power.39FootnoteId. 2033/34. In the United States, executive agreements are concluded exclusively by the President of the United States. They are one of three mechanisms through which the United States makes binding international commitments. Some authors consider executive treaties to be international treaties because they bind both the United States and another sovereign state. However, under U.S. constitutional law, executive agreements are not considered treaties within the meaning of the treaty clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the Council and the approval of two-thirds of the Senate to be considered a treaty. The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the president the power to enter into executive agreements. However, it may be authorized to do so by Congress, or it may do so on the basis of the authority conferred on it to conduct foreign relations.

Despite questions about the constitutionality of executive treaties, the Supreme Court ruled in 1937 that they had the same power as treaties. Since executive agreements are concluded by order of the outgoing president, they are not necessarily binding on his successors. In the United States, executive agreements are internationally binding when negotiated and concluded under the authority of the president in foreign policy, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, or under previous law of Congress. .